brics’ bank: possibilities and constraints  by Luna, Víctor Manuel Isidro
3 E
co
no
m
ía
 I
nf
or
m
a 
nú
m
. 3
98
  m
ay
o 
- 
ju
ni
o 
s 2
01
6
Abstract
Some scholars have highlighted the 
declining power of the G7 under the 
leadership of the US and the rising relevance 
of some underdeveloped countries grouped 
as “brics” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa), which has spearheaded 
a new hegemony: the creation of a new 
bank that will function as a development 
bank. This article aims to show whether or 
not a brics’ bank is desirable and doable. 
Our conclusions show that China is the 
only country among the brics with high 
growth, foreign international reserves, and 
current account surpluses. The creation of a 
new development bank, therefore, depends 
on China’s will to finance other members.
Resumen
Para algunos autores, el poder económico y 
político de los países más avanzados del mun-
do, liderados por los Estados Unidos, está de-
clinando. Al mismo tiempo, algunos países 
subdesarrollados como Brasil, Rusia, India, 
China y Sudáfrica (llamados brics) han lla-
mado la atención por la cantidad de reservas 
que poseen y porque podrían crear un nuevo 
orden internacional basado en una institución 
ﬁnanciera que promueva el crecimiento: un 
banco de desarrollo. El objetivo de este artícu-
lo es mostrar si el establecimiento de este banco 
es deseable y realista. Nuestros resultados mues-
tran que China es el único país de brics que 
tiene excedentes en la cuenta corriente, alto 
nivel de reservas y crecimiento económico; 
entonces, la decisión de establecer el banco de-
pende de China.
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1. Introduction
The world economy changed after wwii. Keynes’ statement at Bretton Woods 
that underdeveloped countries “clearly have nothing to contribute and will 
merely encumber the ground” (quoted in Camara-Neto and Vernengo 2009, 
200) was true at that time but perhaps the statementno longer holds. Economi-
cally and politically, several underdeveloped countries seem to be very im-
portant in today’s world. However, does the economic and political weight of 
these underdeveloped countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Af-
rica, or brics)1 mean they can challenge the existing international world order 
1 Some scholars use brics to refer to four countries only: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. We inclu-
de South Africa and thus “brics.”
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established by the G7 (the us, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Germany, and the 
uk) under the hegemony of the us?Can they initiate a new era of sustainable 
and high growth? Some scholars claim thatsuch situations are not possible for 
economic and political reasons. However, other scholars point out that brics 
can enforce a new international order and a new era of economic growth based 
on the creation of new ﬁnancial institutions. Such a bank would function as a 
development bank (Stuenkel 2013; Portal do Governo Brasileiro 2014). 
In this article, we are not concerned about whether or not brics can chal-
lenge the prevailing world international order. Rather, our objective is to 
shed some light on the feasibility of such a development bank to spur eco-
nomic growth. After this introduction, in Section 2, we deal with the eco-
nomic performance of both the G7 and brics from 1989 to 2012, and we 
highlight the outstanding increase of foreign exchange carried out by brics. 
In Section 3, we take into account whether or not a brics’ bank is desirable, 
and in Section 4 we consider whether or not this bank is doable, taking into 
consideration historical and political constraints the new bank may face. In 
Section 5, we present concluding remarks.
2. Economic performance of G7 
and BRICS and foreign reserve accumulation in BRICS
brics’ increasing importance worldwide is based on (1) its population (42.3 
percent of the world population in 2012), (2) its gdp level, and (3) its foreign 
exchange reserve level. In this section, we show the following: (1) the G7 
and brics’ shares of world gdp at ppp2 (Purchasing Power Parity) from 1989 to 
2012, and (2) growth rates and the levels of foreign exchange reserves for the 
G7 and brics. 
Shares of world gdp have decreased in the G7 and increased in the brics. 
Figure 1 shows this phenomenon. However, we have to note that disparities 
exist through time and between the groups. First, for the G7, the share of 
world gdp remained constant at 50 percent from 1989 to 2000; thereafter, it 
decreased steadily. For brics, it can be seen in Figure 1 that the share of world 
gdp increased slowly from 1989 to 2000, with the pace accelerating from 
2000 onwards.
2 Making comparisons among countries at gdp at ppp can cause some problems depending on the 
bundle that is used. If this bundle is too basic, underdeveloped countries’ gdp will be overestimated 
because prices of nontradeable goods are cheaper than in the developed countries.
Víctor Manuel Isidro Luna
5
Second, the evolution of each country differs in its respective group. For 
the G7 (see Figure 2), we can say that the importance in the overall share of 
world gdp has diminished for European countries (Germany, France, Italy, 
and the uk), that of Canada has remained quite constant, and the us exhibited 
an increasing share in the 1990s, but this share decreased sharply from the 
beginning of the 2000s onward. Meanwhile, for brics, South Africa seems 
unimportant (see Figure 3), due to its declining share in the world gdp. Rus-
sia has recovered from the 1990s’ collapse (due to oil and gas exports),3 but 
its economy is smaller than during the time of the former Soviet Union. 
Brazil’s participation in overall gdp has decreased slightly from these levels of 
the 1990s and it is still a primary-export country. Therefore, gdp shares have 
increased in only two economies: India and China (see also May, 1993/94; 
Layne, 2009). China’s gdp participation in the world total increased three-
fold in just 23 years and its value added in industry as a percent of gdp has 
increased from 41.3 percent to 46.5 percent from 1990 to 2011.
Figure 1
Shares of World Gross Domestic Product at PPP
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3 For the Russian strategy of growth during the last 12 years, see Harris (2009).
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Figure 2
Shares of World Gross Domestic Product at PPP: G7
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Figure 3
Shares of World Gross Domestic Product at PPP: BRICS
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Likewise, with respect to their increasing shares of world gdp, brics aug-
mented their level of foreign exchange reserves from 1989 to the present day. 
In 1989, brics accounted for 4 percent of the total foreign exchange reserves 
in the world; in 1999, their share of the total was 13.1 percent; and ﬁnally, in 
2010, brics’ portion of the global reserve was 40.9 percent. In other words, 
brics’ share of the world total reserves has increased 10.2-fold in 21 years. 
Meanwhile, the G7 foreign exchange reserves have fallen continuously from 
1989 onward: 43.2 percent out of the total in 1989, 29 percent in 1999, and 
15.4 percent in 2010. However, a key point to highlight is that China’s share 
in total brics’ reserves represented 73 percent in 2010; this means China holds 
30 percent of the total international reserves. Brazil and Russia had increased 
the level of their reserves after the crisis in 1998, but with the 2007-08 crisis, 
their international reserves fell again. 
Figure 4
BRICS’ Shares of World Foreign Exchange Reserves
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On the one hand, the accumulation of international reserves has represented 
strength for underdeveloped countries because it has helped to either avert 
crisis or handle the dollar superiority in international markets (Rodrik 2006; 
Palley 2014; Lapavitsas 2013; Labrinidis 2014). On the other hand, the accu-
mulation of international reserves has represented a cost, not only because of 
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the spread differential between “the private sector’s cost of short-term borrow-
ing abroad and the yield that the Central Bank earns on its liquid foreign as-
sets” (Rodrik 2005, 7), but also because the foreign exchange reserve could be 
used to increase the stock of capital or social spending (antipoverty programs). 
Following this line of thought, some post-Keynesian scholars argue that as 
long as international reserves go beyond 5 or 6 percent of gdp, the surplus can 
be used to increase the stock of capital (Cruz 2006), and subsequently foster 
economic growth. Post-Keynesian scholars also claim that capital controls 
and not the increase of foreign exchange reserve prevent the outﬂow of capi-
tal and exchange rate problems (Grabel 2003; Cruz 2006). Finally, Marxian 
scholars also think that international reserves may have uses beyond buying 
T-bills (Harris 2009; Lapavitsas 2013), and that the accumulation of interna-
tional reserves is excessive. 
3.Is a BRICS’ bank desirable?
Up to this point, we have highlighted the following: (1) shares of world gdp 
and foreign exchange reserves have increased in brics,(2) China accounts for 
the majority of these increases, and (3) existing drawbacks and advantages in 
holding foreign exchange reserves. Now, we examine brics cooperation, the 
creation of brics bank, what a development bank is, and development bank 
desirability. 
Goldman Sachs researcher Jim O’Neill wrote a pioneering paper about 
brics’ economic relevance in 2001. He argued that China and India had 
larger economies than Italy and Canada, sothe former countries should have 
been invited to join the G7, and the latter should have been asked to leave. 
The consolidation of brics followed the shock of the 2008 crisis; according to 
Stuenkel (2011), brics gained terrain at that time in economic and political 
terms because members had regular meetings and to some extent coordinated 
their policies, thereby generating positive effects among them. Finally, the 
meetings resulted in the creation of a development bank in 2014. According 
to the Sixth brics Summit celebrated in Fortaleza, Brazil in 2014:
brics, as well as other emdcs [Emerging Markets Economies and Developing 
Countries], continue to face signiﬁcant ﬁnancing constraints to address infra-
structure gaps and sustainable development needs. With this in mind, [they] 
are pleased to announce the signing of the Agreement establishing the New 
Development Bank (ndb), with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infra-
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structure and sustainable development projects in brics and other emerging 
and developing economies.
Therefore, brics’s objective is to achieve growth with its own resources. His-
torically, according to an orthodox point of view, underdeveloped countries 
have lackedthe capital to ﬁnance infrastructure and development, and have 
to ask for foreign loans or attract foreign direct investment. This situation 
has led to a kind of dependency and to a vicious circle in growth because 
underdeveloped countries have had a myriad of problems with external debt 
or sudden outﬂow of capital. However, according to a heterodox point of 
view, underdeveloped countries have been capital-starved because either debt 
service payments or remittances on foreign direct investment have repre-
sented a heavy outﬂow of resources (Baran 1957: Prebish 1970; Toussaint 
2008a, 200b), underdeveloped countries have capital because they send cap-
ital abroad. Especially since the East Asian crisis in 1997, underdeveloped 
countries have accumulated enormous amounts of international reserves, and 
they subsequently purchased T-bills. Instead of buying T-bills, these reserves 
may be used to increase the investment rate in brics, which has been stagnat-
ing in Brazil, South Africa, and Russia. India also needs a heavy investment 
infrastructure (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
Investment Rate in BRICS Countries
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Foreign reserve accumulation may obey an active decision to hoard money 
—in contrast to the problem of high capital mobility-- and subsequently may 
be assigned to key sectors in each country, such as manufacturing, agricul-
ture, infrastructure, etc. Some notion of planned industrialization directed by 
the state has been highlighted by development economics and Latin Ameri-
can structuralism (see Gerschenkron 1962; Prebish 1970; Sen 1983; Bruck 
1998;Levy Yeyati et al. 2004; Hirschman 2013). Therefore, the idea of a 
new bank may soundquite convenient as a means to foster growth and de-
velopment.4 Now, we proceed to analyze what a development bank is in the 
economic literature.
Historically, three phases can be distinguished in development banking. 
In phase I a development bank as an “Investment Bank” was aEuropean phe-
nomenon in the 19th century; Belgium, France, and Germany used develop-
ment banks (investment banks) to catch up economically with England in 
the 19th century. During this period, banks invested in railroads, channels, 
and heavy industries (Diamond 1957, 1981; Cameron 1953, 1958, 1961, 1972; 
Gerschenkron 1962; Patrick 1972; Tilly 1972, 1992). Phase II, from the Great 
Depression-wwii to the early 1980; sawthe development bank as an industrial 
promoter. Underdeveloped (and some developed) countries created devel-
opment banks in response to the need for establishing national policies to 
foster industrialization to promote growth and subsequently development. 
The Japan Development Bank (jdb), the KfW in Germany, the Industrial 
Development of Canada, the Korean Development Bank (kdb), the Naﬁnsa 
in Mexico, the Corfo in Chile, and the bndes in Brazil were established dur-
ing this period. Also during this period, heavy industrial activities as well as 
agriculture, housing, infrastructure, education, etc. were the main targets 
(Aubey 1961; Curralero 1999; Amsden 2001; Levy Yeyati et al. 2004; Guth 
2006). Finally, in phase III, a development bank focused on narrower ob-
jectives than in previous periods had sectors such as international trade and 
Small and Medium Enterprises (smes) as its targets. This is the period under 
neoliberalism when development banks could solve market imperfections in 
the capital markets (Curralero 1999; Amsden 2001; Levy Yeyati et al. 2004; 
Guth 2006; Lazzirini et al. 2012; Isidro Luna 2013).
The historical differences among the three types of development banks 
can be addressed in terms of ownership, institutions that led growth (the 
4 Bresser-Pereira and Galo argue that perfect allocation of capital is always impossible because the 
inﬂow of capital provokes exchange rate appreciation and a subsequent loss of competitiveness.
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market or the state), and the activities carried out: (1) Investment Banks were 
private ownership and proﬁt-oriented, as opposed to the second historical 
phase in which development banks were government sponsored institutions; 
(2) phase III’s development banks were mainly government-sponsored insti-
tutions but served only as a complement to the economy, which had to be led 
by the market; (3) in phases I and III, development banks shared the market-
led economy but differed in the ownership and the activities supported (see 
Table 1).
Table 1
Development Banks by Ownership, Institutional Framework,
and Activities Supported
Phases Ownership Institution Activities
I Private Market Infrastructure and heavy industry
II Public State Infrastructure, heavy industry, agriculture, housing, etc
III Public Market International trade and smes
Even though development banks have existed for hundreds of years, it is still 
difﬁcult to operationally deﬁne what a development is (Lazzarini et al. 2012). 
This difﬁculty is due to the time and the space in which each development 
bank operates. In this article, we deﬁne development according to the follow-
ing characteristics (Diamond 1957, 1981; Maug 1973; Ramirez 1987; Bruck 
1998: Arméndariz 1999; Guth 2006; Lazzarini et al. 2012): (1) it is a ﬁnancial 
intermediary, (2) it must have the goal of promoting development, and (3) it 
is mostly a government-sponsored institution. Thus, our deﬁnition of a de-
velopment bank resembles that in the second period in the history of develop-
ment banking: development banks with public ﬁnancing playing a big role in 
the economies of their respective countries. With this deﬁnition, we proceed 
to analyze whether or not a development bank may spur growth during the 
current neoliberal era.
4. BRICS’ bank feasibility: constraints to ponder
Can a new development bank produce growth for its members, using its own 
resources in this neoliberal era? According to Rodrik (2004), markets and 
government forces must combine to diversify the economies of underdevel-
oped countries. This coordination revolves around two market failures, one 
12
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of which arises because of information problems, and the other because of the 
need for high-scale investments in infrastructure. A development bank’s role 
in this process is deﬁned as:
Going from the pre-investment phase of a project to the investment stage re-
quires a more sizable expenditure of resources, which must be ﬁnanced some-
how. Commercial banks are typically not good at this….Hence governments 
will need alternatives sources of ﬁnance. This may come in several different 
forms, depending on the available ﬁscal and bureaucratic resources. Some ex-
amples are: development banks (Rodrik 2004, 26)
Therefore, a development bank can be distinguished by these combinations of 
forces: the market should lead the economy, and the state should be subordi-
nated to the market. In Rodrik’s point of view, industrial policy must be pri-
vately oriented, and development banks must correct market failures in build-
ing infrastructure. Despite the fact that Rodrik notes that underdeveloped 
countries operate under a different environment in neoliberalism than in the 
Golden Age of capitalism, he dismisses the effect of important variables such 
as ﬁnancialization and class struggle. In our point of view, Polanyi provides 
a broader framework than Rodrik, by addressing the constraints and possi-
bilities of spurring growth in the future. Polanyi (2014) states that the term 
economy may have two meanings: (1) a mean-end relationship, in which 
scarce resources have to be allocated to alternative uses. Supposed rationality 
leads to correct choices. The self-regulated market, wage-labor, and private 
property are institutions considered under this meaning; (2) the human being 
to nature and human to human relationship, in which economic activity is 
never institutionalized by economic institutions.
The ﬁrst meaning is logical, and the economic system follows only its own 
rules; this can be called an autonomous economy. The second meaning is em-
pirical, and the economic system is conditioned to politics, culture, religion, 
etc.; this is called a conditioned economy. According to this second meaning, 
no economic institutions are important because they can provide unity and 
stability to the economic activities. According to Polanyi, there was an at-
tempt to establish an autonomous economy during most of the 19th century 
and in the beginning of the 20th with disastrous societal consequences because 
the self-regulated market led to the Great Depression. For him, an institution 
such as this would never again reign in economic policy; societies after wwii 
would always be opposed to the commodiﬁcation of land and labor. 
Víctor Manuel Isidro Luna
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Therefore, contrary to the orthodox point of view, even during the major 
part of the history of capitalism –the mercantile and Golden Age era-- econo-
mies have been conditioned to other no economic institutions. However, 
neoliberalism has been characterized by an intensiﬁed process of commodi-
ﬁcation of nature and labor, and also has been the period of unrestrained ﬁ-
nancial markets. Thus, this scenario poses constraints to a development bank 
that plans to mobilize resources to build infrastructure and sustainable devel-
opment projects. In our point of view, a development bank would face the 
following constraints:
First of all, the bank would face increased competition in capital markets. 
From wwii to the mid-1970s, the world economy grew steadily at a high 
growth rate. Not only developed countries but also undeveloped and socialist 
countries performed quite well. After the Great Depression and wwii, the us 
reconstructed Western Europe and Japan and also set conditions to strengthen 
the economies of its allies and increase the volume of trade in the world. The 
dollar was converted to gold, but other currencies were pegged to the dollar. 
In addition, capital controls were established, and interest rates remained low. 
In this scenario, some advanced capitalist countries and undeveloped 
countries established national policies directed by the state to achieve growth 
using several tools, development banks being one of them. Even though wag-
es and the volume of employment increased during this period, for advanced 
capitalist economies, improvements in the conditions of life for the majority 
of people were called for because the race was with socialist countries. 
From the end of 1970s onwards, growth rates have slowed globally. Self-
regulation has appeared above all in ﬁnancial activities, eroding the frame-
work established during the Golden Age of capitalism (Campbell and Bakir 
2012). According to Krippner (2011) and Lapavitas (2013), households, states, 
and typical industrial business carry out extensive ﬁnancial activities today. 
Therefore, a question that must be answered is how a development bank can 
spur growth in a worldwide context dominated by ﬁnance.
Second, a development banks may: (1) serve as a tool for dominating other 
countries, (2) serve as a tool for ﬁnancing no key sectors, and (3) function 
adequately only in speciﬁc periods of time according to historical, social, and 
economic conditions. First of all, for orthodox scholars, the World Bank has 
been the most important development bank throughout history. For such 
scholars, the World Bank was created because of the capital market failure 
during the Great Depression (Krueger 1998). It was thought that the world 
capital market was imperfect and that international cooperation was needed 
14
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to channel capital from rich countries to poor countries (Gavin and Rodrik 
1995; Stiglitz 1999). The main idea was that loans granted from the World 
Bank to poor countries had to be at a lower interest rate than those prevailing 
in the market.
However, for heterodox scholars, the World Bank has never ﬁnanced de-
velopment. During its ﬁrst years of operation, the World Bank ﬁnanced only 
projects with a high-expected rate of proﬁt in stable countries. Besides, as 
a resource for underdeveloped countries, the World Bank was meaningless 
because the main capital provider at the end of the 1940s and throughout the 
1950s was the us with the Marshall Plan. When the World Bank did make 
loans to poor countries, those loans were very costly at a very high rate of in-
terest and “relatively short period of repayment” (Toussaint 2008, 21). In ad-
dition, frequently the majority of the money lent by the World Bank to poor 
countries was on the condition that the money had to be spent in developed 
countries (see Table 2).
Table 2
Geographical Distribution of Expenditures Made with Funds 
Loaned by the World Bank, 1946-1955
Country 1946-51 1952 1953 1954 1954
us 73.1 65.3 63.5 58.7 47.1
Europe 11.3 25.3 30.1 38.1 48.1
Canada 6.6 8.8 4.3 2.4 2.9
Subtotal
Industrialized Countries 91 99.4 97.9 99.2 98.8
Adapted from Toussaint (2008).
In the 1970s, according to Krueger (1998), the World Bank gained strength 
as a capital provider because the us entrusted to it the task of furnishing re-
sources to poor countries. At the onset of granting resources to poor coun-
tries, the World Bank did not ask for any conditionality; however, with the 
international crisis during 1973/74 and the debt crisis in 1982, the World 
Bank spearheaded forcing poor countries towards neoliberalism, and we dare 
say that scarce development and inhibited growth have been the result.There-
fore, both economic criteria and political criteria determine the performance 
of development banks. 
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A further example of unsuccessful multilateral development is regional 
banks. During the feeble discussion regarding the Bank of the South’s5 (Ban-
co del Sur) creation, some scholars such as Ocampo and Titelman (2009) 
argued that previous experiences of development banking had been success-
ful in providing capital in Latin America. Ocampo and Titelman reviewed 
the Andean Development Corporation’s (caf)6 case. The caf was created to 
support “the economic and social development of their member countries 
and focuses mainly on medium- and long-term lending, preferably in areas 
that would foster economic complementarities among the member countries” 
(Ocampo and Titelman 2009, 251). In the 1990s and 2000s, caf has been the 
major capital provider of short-term and long-term loans for its members. 
However, caf resources have primarily ﬁnanced the service and commercial 
sectors, which can barely spark economic growth. This situation represents a 
signiﬁcant change in Latin America with respect to the period from 1940 to 
1980, when development economics and structuralism proposed heavy indus-
trialization through high investments led by the state as a way of catching up 
to the leading countries. 
Finally, taking into account the experience of national development 
banks, banks such as Naﬁnsa in Mexico and bndes in Brazil were success-
ful and unsuccessful during particular periods in their country’s history. For 
example, Naﬁnsa, in Mexico, was the main capital provider to the industrial 
sector from wwii through the 1970s. Furthermore, Naﬁnsa not only built 
many of the basic industries in the country, such as the steel industry, but it 
also ﬁnanced construction of very important infrastructure such as the uni-
versity and the subway system. Another interesting example, along the same 
lines, is the bndes in Brazil. From 1952 through the 1970s, this bank helped to 
build the biggest industrial complex in Latin America (Curralero 1998; Diniz 
2004; Guth 2006). Both banks were models of development banking and ex-
tensively studied during that time. However, national development banks did 
not successfully promote growth during particular periods, as was the case for 
5 From 2003 to 2007, some Latin American countries had current account surpluses and a notable 
increase of foreign exchange reserves that almost matched the arrival of left wing governments. 
This situation gave rise to the idea of the Banco del Sur, which was created on September 26, 2009. 
The presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay signed an 
agreement establishing the bank with an initial capital of $20 billion. However, since that date, the 
bank has not yet started operation.
6 caf ’s original members were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; currently the country 
members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pana-
ma, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Naﬁnsa from 1982 onward, when it began to serve neoliberal purposes, being 
mostly a second-tier ﬁnancial institution granting resources in the short-term 
to smes. The same could be said for bndes during the 1980s and the 1990s7 
and Corfo in Chile (Carmona 2009).
Luna-Martinez and Vicente (2012) have contended that during the 1980s, 
development banks suffered from a major restructing, but they have been 
playing a counter cyclical role after the current crisis. However, their effect 
on growth is something that can be assessed only with the passage of time. 
Therefore, the lesson here is that national development banks could be good 
at promoting growth, depending on the national as well as the international 
context in which they are embedded.
Third, the only country that can ﬁnance another is China, assuming ﬁs-
cal balance; it is a macroeconomic identity in an open economy in which the 
current account (CC) is the difference between savings (S) and investment (I):
CC=S-I (1)
Positive CC means that domestic savings are larger than domestic invest-
ments, so countries with surpluses can export capital. In contrast, if domestic 
savings are smaller than domestic investments, these countries have a deﬁcit 
and capital has to be imported. Then, concisely, which of the brics’ countries 
have capital to be exported? Table 3 shows CC for all the brics from 1994 
to 2013. As can be seen, only Russia and China have had persistent CC sur-
pluses, with China as the most powerful country, as this article has shown. 
Does this mean that China is ﬁnancing other members?
China has to make an economic and political decision whether to ﬁnance 
underdeveloped countries or the us. Glosny (2010) argues that China wants 
to cooperate with the us; meanwhile, Stuenkel believes that brics want to 
challenge the us. The two previously mentioned positions are summarized 
in Figure 5 based on the theory of global imbalances. The us is the larg-
est consumer in the world, and China directs Foreign Direct Investment to 
the us. China pursues an export-oriented model based on low wages and an 
undervalued exchange rate. Other brics’ members have very weak domestic 
markets and offer a very low rate of investment. Then, is China really indus-
trializing other poor countries (being itself poor) or does it just want an exit 
to their products granting commercial credit? Can China inﬂuence the policy 
of the consumer of last resort carried out by the us?
7 However, from 2002 onward, bndes has been very active in trying to promote growth.
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Table 3
Current Account Balance. Percent of GDP: BRICS
Year Brazil China India Russia
South 
Africa
1994 -0.2 1.2 -0.5 2.0 0.0
1995 -2.4 0.2 -1.6 1.8 -1.6
1996 -2.8 0.8 -1.5 2.8 -1.2
1997 -3.5 3.9 -0.7 0.0 -1.5
1998 -4.0 3.1 -1.7 0.1 -1.6
1999 -4.3 1.9 -0.7 12.6 -0.5
2000 -3.8 1.7 -1.0 18.0 -0.1
2001 -4.2 1.3 0.3 11.1 0.3
2002 -1.5 2.4 1.4 8.4 0.8
2003 0.8 2.8 1.5 8.2 -1.0
2004 1.8 3.6 0.1 10.1 -3.1
2005 1.6 5.9 -1.2 11.1 -3.4
2006 1.3 8.6 -1.0 9.6 -5.1
2007 0.1 10.1 -0.6 6.0 -6.7
2008 -1.7 9.1 -2.5 6.2 -7.0
2009 -1.5 5.2 -1.9 4.0 -3.8
2010 -2.2 4 -3.2 4.4 -1.9
2011 -2.2 1.9 -3.4 5.1 -2.3
2012 -2.4 2.6 -5.0 3.5 -5.0
2013 -3.6 2.0 -2.6 1.6 -5.6
Source: World Bank 2013.
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Figure 6
China’s Option of Financing
United States
(1)
China
(Credit)
Other BRICS
members (2)
Companies (FDI)
Consumers (Credit)
Consumer the last resort
Export-oriented model
Low wages
Credit to consumption (Chinese products)
Credit to production
Fourth, it is worth noting that nothing is known about how this new bank 
will make decisions, which countries will beneﬁt the most, how this bank 
will avoid committing other policy-makers’ vices such as corruption,8 or how 
citizens will participate in determining the policies of this bank, etc. For ex-
ample, Willis (1995) has reported that bndes had near total autonomy from 
political interests, but Diniz (2004) has argued that bndes has been a tool for 
the Brazilian ruling classes, and in the same vein, Lazzirini et al. (2012) have 
asserted that bndes disbursement from 2000s onwards has beneﬁted some of 
Brazil’s most prominent politicians.
5. Conclusion
We have seen in this article that, ﬁrst, shares of world gdp at ppp are declin-
ing for the G7 and increasing for brics, but China and India account for the 
majority of this increase. Similarly, foreign exchange reserves have increased 
in brics but China is the only important country. Second, a brics’ bank may 
be desirable as a means of allocating capital from rich countries to the poor; 
however, past experiences have shown that development banks are not good 
at promoting development because either they are an instrument of domina-
tion or they do not support priority sectors. In this case, development banks 
8 During the discussion about the Banco del Sur, one of the reasons for favoring a new regional 
development bank apart from the distribution of pooled regional funds was as a regulator for each 
national development bank that received funds. According to Marshall and Rochon (2009, 189 and 
190), the new development bank will take care of the “Achilles’ heel” of the Latin American public 
banks, which is corruption. However, what these authors did not mention is how the new bank will 
avoid committing this error.
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can promote economic growth restricted to the national and international 
context in which they operate. How can we avoid repeating this mistake? 
That is an unanswered question for proponents of brics’ development bank. 
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